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Would Order-By-Order Auctions Be Competitive?
We model two methods of executing segregated retail orders: brokers' routing, whereby brokers allocate orders using the market maker's overall performance, and order-by-order auctions, where market makers bid on individual orders, a recent U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proposal. Order-by-order auctions improve allocative efficiency, but face a winner's curse reducing retail investor welfare, particularly when liquidity is limited. Additional market participants competing for retail orders fail to improve total efficiency and investor welfare when entrants possess information superior to incumbent wholesalers. Our results hold when new entrants are less informed or the information structure differs. We also examine the cross-subsidization of brokers' routing.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir (Majalah) | 1 |
| Penerbit | United States: American Finance Association 2025 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 80 Issue 4, Aug 2025 |
| Subjek | Auctions Market Retail order Market makers |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1540-6261 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 562 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Journal of Finance |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |