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How do corporate boards evolve?
the study examines three key perspectives: the scope of operations (complexity driving board size and independence), monitoring requirements (aligning board attributes with managerial oversight needs), and CEO negotiation power (influence over board composition). Analyzing 1,019 U.S. industrial firms post-IPO (1988–1992), the findings reveal that board structure is primarily shaped by operational complexity and monitoring demands, supporting value-maximizing governance. Larger, more diverse firms tend to have bigger, more independent boards, while high monitoring costs reduce board size. CEO influence, however, showed mixed effects, with powerful CEOs often reducing board independence. The study challenges one-size-fits-all governance policies, emphasizing context-dependent board design. It also highlights unresolved questions, such as the role of external theories (e.g., resource dependence) and dynamic board adaptation during organizational growth. Future research directions include examining outsider director heterogeneity and longitudinal board evolution.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| AMP2201 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Briarcliff Manor, NY: Academy of Management 2008 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 22, No. 1, Feb., 2008 |
| Subjek | Corporate governance Agency theory Organizational growth Corporate Boards CEO Influence |
| ISBN/ISSN | 15589080 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 2 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | Academy of Management Perspectives |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |