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Does it take a village to raise a whistleblower?
Analyzing 216 cases of top-management fraud from 1996 to 2004, the study reveals that boards detected only 30% of cases, while external actors—employees (12%), industry regulators (9%), short sellers (10%), and media (9%)—played critical roles in uncovering the remaining 70%. Key findings highlight the interplay between access to information and incentives for whistleblowing. Employees, despite facing severe repercussions (82% were fired or harassed), emerged as significant whistleblowers, particularly in industries with federal rewards (e.g., Medicare). Media outlets exposed 36% of the fraud's total dollar value, leveraging their credibility and independence. Auditors, historically reluctant, increased reporting post-Sarbanes-Oxley due to stronger legal incentives. Notably, "all-star" analysts and journalists often benefited professionally from whistleblowing, contrasting with employees who risked careers. The study challenges traditional fraud-detection theories, showing no single group consistently uncovers misconduct. Instead, a collective effort—encompassing employees, regulators, and media—proves essential. Practical implications suggest firms should foster ethical cultures, protect whistleblowers, and align incentives to reward transparency. Future research could explore organizational practices that balance loyalty with honesty, and the role of board policies in encouraging early fraud reporting.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| AMP2502 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Briarcliff Manor, NY: Academy of Management 2011 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 25, No. 2, May 2011 |
| Subjek | Whistleblowing corporate fraud Fraud Detection Sarbanes-Oxley Act regulatory oversight |
| ISBN/ISSN | 15589080 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 3 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | Academy of Management Perspectives |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |