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This study examines whether active boards of directors enhance firm value, analyzing data from over 5,000 board observations (1999–2005). Contrary to critiques that frequent meetings prioritize routine tasks over strategic oversight, findings reveal that increased board activity—measured by meeting frequency and committee independence—positively correlates with firm value (using Tobin’s Q). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) further amplified this effect by mandating stricter governance practices, though independent committees alone showed no incremental performance gains.
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| AMP2501 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Briarcliff Manor, NY: Academy of Management 2011 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 25, No. 1, February 2011 |
| Subjek | Corporate governance Firm value shareholder value Sarbanes-Oxley Act board activity monitoring effectiveness |
| ISBN/ISSN | 15589080 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 2 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | Academy of Management Perspectives |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |