Tesis
Identifikasi Adverse Selection pada Sistem Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional di Indomesia
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) ensures that all individuals can access healthcare services without financial hardship. In Indonesia, UHC is implemented through the Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) scheme, which operates on a risk-pooling mechanism. However, such systems are prone to adverse selection, where individuals with higher health risks are more likely to remain active, while healthier individuals opt out, knowing they have lower medical needs. To reduce the magnitude of adverse selection, the government issued Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2022, mandating all citizens to enroll in JKN. Despite its mandatory nature, adverse selection may persist, as individuals can still become inactive by not paying their premiums. This study aims to identify the presence of adverse selection within the JKN system using cross-sectional data from BPJS collected in 2023. The findings indicate that adverse selection continues to exist, posing a challenge to the financial sustainability of Indonesia’s national health insurance scheme.
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| T 137/25 | PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir | 1 |
| Penerbit | Depok: Program Pascasarjana Ilmu Ekonomi Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis Universitas Indonesia 2025 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | Insurance Adverse selection Risk-pooling |
| ISBN/ISSN | - |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | xi, 45 p. : il. ; 30 cm. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | Tesis |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |