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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
ELECTION VS APPOINTMENTS OF
LOCAL EXECUTIVE: THE IMPACT
OF INTERIM LOCAL EXECUTIVE
ON FISCAL OUTCOMES
TESIS
FAKULTAS EKONOMI DAN BISNIS
2025
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Tesis

Election Vs Appointments of Local Executive: The Impact of Interim Local Executive on Fiscal Outcomes

Pemilihan vs Pengangkatan Eksekutif Daerah: Dampak Penjabat Kepala Daerah terhadap Hasil Fiskal

Doddy Purwoharyono - ; Muhammad Halley Yudhistira (Penguji) - ; Rus'an Nasrudin (Pembimbing/Promotor) - ; Rizki Nauli Siregar (Penguji) - ;

Indonesia's decentralized reform (1999–2005), the expansion of regions from 2001, and the introduction of direct local elections in 2005 complicated the political landscape and introduce electoral inefficiency. To reduce electoral inefficiencies caused by staggered local elections, the government implemented simultaneous local elections (Pilkada Serentak). However, this reform created leadership gaps in 2022–2023, filled by centrally appointed interim executives. This study analyzes the fiscal impact of the appointment of interim local executive during the leadership transition in Indonesia in 2022–2023 due to the Pilkada Serentak. Using panel data from 508 districts/cities (2020–2023) and a staggered difference-in-differences approach (Callaway & Sant’Anna, 2021), this study evaluates its impact on local revenue (PAD), local government spending, and the number of recipients of social food assistance. The results show no significant change in PAD, a decrease in spending of 3.3%, and an increase in aid recipients of 10.6%. The reduction in spending mainly occurred in capital and goods spending. This finding is consistent with the principal–agent framework: acting regional heads who are vertically accountable to the central government and do not have electoral incentives tend to prioritize administrative compliance. Although this appointment increases the consistency of central policy, it limits local fiscal autonomy and has the potential to become an instrument of the national political budget cycle. This study highlights the dilemma between central control and local responsiveness in decentralization.


Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
T 138/25PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir1
PenerbitDepok: Program Pascasarjana Ilmu Ekonomi Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis Universitas Indonesia 2025
Edisi-
SubjekLocal government
Fiscal policy
Interim executives
Political Budget Cycles
ISBN/ISSN-
KlasifikasiNONE
Deskripsi Fisikxii, 70 p. : il. ; 30 cm.
Info Detail SpesifikTesis
Other Version/RelatedTidak tersedia versi lain
Lampiran BerkasTidak Ada Data

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