Text
Executive noncompetes: keeping talent in house or at bay?
While NCAs reduce executive turnover and extend job tenure—particularly in states with strong enforcement—they also stifle talent mobility, diminish executive quality, and fail to boost firm profitability or R&D investment. Key findings indicate that executives in high-enforcement states receive lower compensation growth, rely more on fixed salaries (reducing performance incentives), and exhibit reduced professional development due to restricted career mobility. Notably, the study contrasts high-enforcement jurisdictions (e.g., Massachusetts) with low-enforcement ones (e.g., California), showing that the latter fosters dynamic labor markets and innovation hubs like Silicon Valley. The article cautions firms against overreliance on NCAs, highlighting their potential to create stagnant talent pools and undermine competitive advantage.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| AMP2504 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Briarcliff Manor, NY: Academy of Management 2011 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 25, No. 4, November 2011 |
| Subjek | Talent retention R&D investment Noncompete Agreements (NCAs) executive mobility labor market flexibility enforcement jurisdictions human capital stagnation |
| ISBN/ISSN | 15589080 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 2 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | Academy of Management Perspectives |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |