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Executive stock options: still plenty of shenanigans?
Highlights research by David Cicero, which analyzes over 37,000 stock option transactions from 1996 to 2005, revealing that executives often time their option exercises to maximize personal gains. Cicero's findings challenge prior assumptions that executives immediately sell shares acquired through options, showing instead that many hold or sell shares back to the company, skewing perceptions of compensation practices. The study identifies abnormal returns linked to insider knowledge, with executives more likely to exercise options on favorable trading days, especially pre-SOX. While SOX improved reporting transparency, it did not eliminate opportunistic behavior entirely.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| AMP2402 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Briarcliff Manor, NY: Academy of Management 2010 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 24, No. 2, May 2010 |
| Subjek | Corporate governance Financial Shenanigans Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX executive stock options backdating stock option exercises |
| ISBN/ISSN | 15589080 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 2 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | Academy of Management Perspectives |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |