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Pricing returned check charges under asymmetric information
Udell develops a theoretical model where banks face credit losses from "bad funds" deposits and overdrafts, with consumers varying in their probabilities of bankruptcy (high-risk vs. low-risk). The model demonstrates that competitive banks may set NSF fees above marginal processing costs to offset cross-subsidization between customer types, leveraging deposit-hold schedules and minimum balance requirements as complementary tools. Empirical observations, such as the disparity between NSF and stop-payment fees, support the hypothesis that banks use multidimensional pricing to optimize risk management.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| JMCB1804 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Ohio: Ohio State University Press 1986 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 18, No. 4, Nov., 1986 |
| Subjek | Asymmetric Information Consumer banking Bankruptcy Risk Not-Sufficient-Funds (NSF) Fees deposit pricing competitive equilibrium |
| ISBN/ISSN | 00222879 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 11 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | Journal of Money, Credit and Banking |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |