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Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents
This paper models the wage-contract negotiation procedure between a union and a firm as a sequential bargaining process in which the union must decide, in each period, whether or not to strike for the duration of that period. We show that there exist subgame-perfect equilibria in which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement, although both parties are completely rational and fully informed. This has implications for other inefficient phenomena, such as tariff wars, debt negotiations, and wars in general. We characterize the set of equilibria, show that strikes can occur in real time, and discuss extensions of the model, such as lockouts and the possibility of multiple recontracting opportunities.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| TAER 8101 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Nashville: American Economic Association 1991 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 81, No. 1, Mar., 1991 |
| Subjek | Negotiation procedure Debt negotiations Recontracting opportunities |
| ISBN/ISSN | 0002-8282 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 13 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The American Economic Review |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |