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An Experimental Analysis of Strikes in Bargaining Games with One-Sided Private Information
We study two-player pie-splitting games in which one player knows the pie and the other knows only its probability distribution. We compare treatments in which incentive-efficient strikes (disagreements) are possible with alternatives in which efficiency forbids strikes. We find that incentive-efficiency is very helpful in explaining when strikes occur. There is also evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the subjects' altruism and in their risk preferences. This means that the common-knowledge assumptions of game theory cannot be controlled in experiments; but in our experiments the main theoretical conclusions seem robust to violations of these assumptions.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| TAER 8101 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Nashville: American Economic Association 1991 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 81, No. 1, Mar., 1991 |
| Subjek | Strikes occur Theoretical conclusions Players One-sided private information |
| ISBN/ISSN | 0002-8282 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 26 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The American Economic Review |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |