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Compulsory Arbitration as a Form of Incomes Policy: The Australian Case
The role of arbitration tribunals in settling industrial disputes and fixing the terms of employment by legally binding rulings is a distinctive feature of the Australian economy. A centralized system of wage decisions gradually developed out of the arbitration procedures established as a substitute for collective bargaining during a period of chronic unemployment and unrest around the turn of the century. Centralized decisions gave the Commonwealth arbitration authority power to influence the movement of wages and salaries in general, and required consideration of a national wages policy. Australian experience in this respect is of considerable interest for other countries considering implementation of an "incomes policy." Arbitration was established in 1904 as a means of preventing poverty and unrest by legal determination and enforcement of minimum wage rates; strikes were prohibited until 1930. The "basic wage," set to cover the needs of a family, became the going wage for unskilled work, and "margins" were granted for different skills and for different conditions of work. The basic wage was automatically adjusted for changes in prices from 1922 to 1953. During the slump of the 1930s, the Court enforced a general reduction in wages, and is credited with having lessened the impact on employment and activity. Since World War II the arbitration authorities have sought to develop procedures appropriate to full employment conditions. In the early 1950s the regulatory function of the system was strengthened by the abolition of automatic adjustment, by uniform increases in margins, and by provision of sanctions against strikes. For a decade, the system helped to moderate wage pressures, but difficulties began to develop in the 1960s when more favorable external conditions were associated with increasing wage drift. Major issues, such as the criteria for determining the scale of wage increases, the advantages and disadvantages of automatic adjustment for changes in the cost of living, and the problem of limiting drift, are discussed in their historical context. High profits in particular industries, favoring large wage increases under specific arbitration decisions or in over-award settlements, posed the choice between permitting similar large increases elsewhere with inflationary consequences or contravening "comparative wage justice" and undermining employees' support for arbitration. Following an unsuccessful attempt to absorb "over-award" payments into award wages in 1967 and the collapse of sanctions against strikes in 1968/69, the system has functioned as "quasi-collective bargaining." A study of wage movements since 1953 suggests that the rate of increase in award wages has generally been responsive to the influence of world price changes and productivity growth, but that developments within the arbitration system in 1967-69 were partly responsible for the faster rise of wages after 1967. The paper concludes that compulsory arbitration should be seen as a valuable instrument of industrial relations, which can have important indirect effects in reducing inflationary wage pressures within the broader framework of an incomes policy. Compulsory arbitration may be particularly applicable in countries commencing their industrial development.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| SP2101 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Washington, D.C.: International monetary fund 1974 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 21, No. 1, Mar., 1974 |
| Subjek | Incomes policy Compulsory arbitration Arbitration procedures Commonwealth |
| ISBN/ISSN | 0020-8027 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 47 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | Staff Papers (International Monetary Fund) |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |