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Using confidential supervisory risk ratings, we document that banks increase risk after going public compared to a control group of banks that filed to go public but withdrew their filings for plausibly exogenous reasons. The increase in risk improves short-term performance at the expense of long-term performance. We argue that the increase in risk stems from pressure to maximize short-term stock prices and earnings once the bank is publicly traded. After going public, banks owned by investors that place greater value on short-term performance increase risk more, and those managed by CEOs with more short-term compensation also increase risk more.
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| TJF8006 | PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir (Majalah) | 1 |
| Penerbit | United States: American Finance Association 2025 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 80 Issue 6, Dec 2025 |
| Subjek | Stock market Stock prices Bank risk |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1540-6261 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 39 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Journal of Finance |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |