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Going for Broke: Bank Reputation and the Performance of Opaque Securities
Can banks’ reputational concerns improve the quality of opaque, off-balance sheet securities, such as mortgage-backed securities? We study this question in a uniquely parsimonious setting. In the 1760s, Dutch banking partnerships securitized West-Indian plantation mortgages that were risky and opaque. High-reputation banks originated better mortgages and issued securities that, on average, retained 17.5% more of their value during a market collapse. Reputational effects are attenuated when the managing partners were married into wealth or received a large share of profits in the short term, suggesting that bank reputation only works if bankers are personally exposed to (long-run) reputational losses.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| TJF8006 | PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir (Majalah) | 1 |
| Penerbit | United States: American Finance Association 2025 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 80 Issue 6, Dec 2025 |
| Subjek | Bank reputation Opaque securities Market collapse |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1540-6261 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 50 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Journal of Finance |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |