The coevolution of board interlock networks and corporate strategic actions

Deskripsi

Studies on board interlock networks are divided into two streams, one examining their dynamics; the other, their consequences. We propose that both phenomena—board interlock dynamics and consequences—are interdependent. Applying structuration theory, we explain and empirically demonstrate how firms' corporate strategic actions (specifically, acquisitions and divestitures) influence the creation and dissolution of different types of board interlock network ties and how these interlock ties, in turn, influence firms' corporate strategic actions. Integrating the two research streams, we complement corporate governance literature by demonstrating how corporate strategic actions and certain types of board interlocks coevolve. We contribute to theory on strategic networks by explaining coevolution through a structuration theoretical lens. Lastly, we illustrate methodological advances by using multiplex stochastic actor-oriented models to analyze coevolution processes.