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A Theory of Managed Trade
This paper proposes a theory that predicts low levels of protection during periods of "normal" trade volume coupled with episodes of "special" protection when trade volumes surge. This dynamic pattern of protection emerges from a model in which countries choose levels of protection in a repeated game facing volatile trade swings. High trade volume leads to a greater incentive to defect unilaterally from cooperative tariff levels. Therefore, as the volume of trade expands, the level of protection must rise in a cooperative equilibrium to mitigate the rising trade volume and hold the incentive to defect in check.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir | 1 | |
| TAER 8004 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Nashville: American Economic Association 1990 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 80, No. 4, Sep., 1990 |
| Subjek | Trade policy |
| ISBN/ISSN | 0002-8282 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 17 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The American Economic Review |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |