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This paper examines the effects of auctioning quota licenses when monopoly power exists. Here the sales of licenses will never raise any revenue if domestic and foreign markets are segmented. More surprisingly, the inability to raise revenue is shown to persist even when arbitrage across markets is possible as long as the quota is not too far from the free trade import level. This suggests that existing revenue estimates from auctioning quota licenses, which are based on the assumption of competition, are upwardly biased. It also makes it likely that quotas implemented by auctioning licenses, even when set optimally, have adverse welfare effects.
Call Number | Location | Available |
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PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir | 1 | |
TAER 8004 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
Penerbit | Nashville: American Economic Association 1990 |
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Edisi | Vol. 80, No. 4, Sep., 1990 |
Subjek | Quota system Monopoly power exists Auction quotas Vanishing revenue |
ISBN/ISSN | 0002-8282 |
Klasifikasi | NONE |
Deskripsi Fisik | 9 p. |
Info Detail Spesifik | The American Economic Review |
Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
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