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Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?

Kolstad, Charles D. - ; Ulen, Thomas S. - ; Johnson, Gary V. - ;

This paper concerns the regulation of hazardous economic activities. Economists have generally viewed ex ante regulations (safety standards, Pigouvian fees) that regulate an activity before an accident occurs as substitutes for ex post policies (exposure to tort liability) for correcting externalities. This paper shows that where there is uncertainty, there are inefficiencies associated with the exclusive use of negligence liability and that ex ante regulation can correct the inefficiencies. In such a case it is efficient to set the safety standard below the level of precaution that would be called for if the standard were used alone.


Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir1
TAER 8004PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
PenerbitNashville: American Economic Association 1990
EdisiVol. 80, No. 4, Sep., 1990
SubjekSafety
Regulations
Hazardous economic activities
Inefficiencies
Negligence liability
ISBN/ISSN0002-8282
KlasifikasiNONE
Deskripsi Fisik14 p.
Info Detail SpesifikThe American Economic Review
Other Version/RelatedTidak tersedia versi lain
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