Text
Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking
A fixed-rate deposit insurance system provides a moral hazard for excessive risk taking and is not viable absent regulation. Although the deposit insurance system appears to have worked remarkably well over most of its 50-year history, major problems began to appear in the early 1980's. This paper tests the hypothesis that increases in competition caused bank charter values to decline, which in turn caused banks to increase default risk through increases in asset risk and reductions in capital.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir | 1 | |
| TAER 8005 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Nashville: American Economic Association 1990 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 80, No. 5, Dec., 1990 |
| Subjek | Risk Banking Deposit insurance Market power |
| ISBN/ISSN | 0002-8282 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 18 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The American Economic Review |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |