Text
CEO compensation can influence the kinds of strategies that firms adopt. We argue that performance-related compensation creates an incentive to look for overly ambitious, hard to implement strategies. At a cost, shareholders can curb this tendency by precommitting to a regime of CEO overcompensation in highly changeable environments. Alternatively shareholders can commit to low CEO pay, although this requires a commitment mechanism ( either by the board of the individual company, or by the society as a whole ) to counter the incentive to renegotiate upwards..Printed Journal
| Call Number | Location | Available | 
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 | 
| Penerbit | : The American Finance Association | 
|---|---|
| Edisi | - | 
| Subjek | Corporate strategy Change management CEO Compensation  | 
| ISBN/ISSN | 00221082 | 
| Klasifikasi | - | 
| Deskripsi Fisik | - | 
| Info Detail Spesifik | - | 
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain | 
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |