Text
We investigate how the market for corporate control ( external governance ) and share - holder activism ( internal governance ) interact. A portfolio that buys firms with the highest level of takeover vulnerability and shorts firms with the lowest level of takeover vulnerability generates an annualized abnormal return of 10 % to 15 % only when public pension fund ( blockholder ) ownership is high as well..Printed Journal
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | : The American Finance Association |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | Equity Corporate control |
| ISBN/ISSN | 00221082 |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |