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Moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions
Kahn, Charles - , Winton, Andrew - ,
The American Finance Association ()
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Artikel Jurnal
PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarja...

Text

Moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions

Kahn, Charles -; Winton, Andrew -

Banks and related financial institutions often have two separate subsidiaries that make loans of similar type but differing risk, for example, a bank and a finance company, or a "good bank/bad bank" structure. Such "bipartite" structures may prevent risk shifting, in which banks misuse their flexibility in choosing and monitoring loans to exploit their debt holders. By "insulating" safer loans from riskier loans, a bipartite structure reduces risk-shifting incentives in the safer subsidiary..Printed Journal


Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
Penerbit: The American Finance Association
Edisi-
Subjek-
ISBN/ISSN00221082
Klasifikasi-
Deskripsi Fisik-
Info Detail Spesifik-
Other Version/RelatedTidak tersedia versi lain
Lampiran BerkasTidak Ada Data

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