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Tunneling or value added ? evidence from mergers by Korean business groups
We examine whether firms belonging to Korean business groups ( chaebols ) benefit from acquisitions they make or whether such acquisitions provide a way for controlling shareholders to increase their wealth by increasing the value of other group firms ( tunneling ). We find that when a chaebol-affiliated firm makes an acquisition, its stock price on average falls.While minority shareholders of a chaebol affiliated firm making an acquisition lose, the controlling shareholder of that firm on average benefits because the acquisition enhances the value of other firms in the group..Printed Journal
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | : The American Finance Association |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | - |
| ISBN/ISSN | 00221082 |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |