Text
Managing foreign subsidiaries: agents of headquarters, or an interdependent network?
In this study, two different theoretical perspectives are used to develop sets of hypotheses regarding the mechanisms used to manage foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations. First, agency theory serves as the basis for a model that predicts the use of monitoring mechanisms and incentive compensation. Then, it is argued that these mechanisms are insufficient for managing subsidiaries characterized by high levels of intra-firm international interdependence, the management of which is critical to many of today's complex global firms. A second set of hypotheses is argued, linking international interdependence to several social control mechanisms. Primary and secondary data from U.S. based multinational corporations were used to test both sets of hypotheses. The results indicate that agency theory, although a useful foundation for studies of control within MNCs, is limited in its ability to explain fully the phenomenon of foreign subsidiary control, however, the model based on intra-firm interdependence had much greater predictive ability..Printed Journal
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | : John Wiley & Sons |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | Interdependence Agency theory Multinational corporations Foreign subsidiaries |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1432095 |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |