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Information control, career concerns, and corporate governance
We examine corporate governance effectiveness when the CEO generates project ideas and the board of directors screens these ideas for approval, However, the precision of the board's screening information is controlled buy the CEO. Moreover, both the CEO and the board have career concerns that interaction. The board's career concerns cause it to distort its investment recommendation procyclically, whereas the CEO's career concerns cause her to sometimes reduce the precision of the board's information. Moreover, the CEO sometimes prefers a less able board, and this happens only during economic upturns, suggesting that corporate governance will be weaker during the economic upturns..Printed Journal
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | The American Finance Association., |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | economic conditions Corporate governance Chief executive officers Information dissemination Boards of directors Careers Impact analysis studies |
| ISBN/ISSN | 221082 |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |