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Business groups and tunneling: evidencefrom private securities offeringsby Korean Chaebols

We examine whether equity-linked private securities offerings are used as a mechanism for tunneling among firms that belong to a Korean chaebol. We find that chaebol issuers involved in intragroup deals set the offering prices to benefit their controlling shareholders. We also find that chaebol issuers (member acquirers) realize an 8.8% (5.8%) higher (lower) announcement return than do other types of issuers (acquirers) if they sell private securities at a premium to other member firms, and if the controlling shareholders receive positive net gains from equity ownership in issuers and acquirers. These results are consistent with tunneling within business groups..Printed Journal

Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
Penerbit The American Finance Association.,
Edisi -
Subjek Economic models
Multivariate analysis
Stock prices
Conglomerates
Securities trading
studies
Rates of return
ISBN/ISSN 221082
Klasifikasi -
Deskripsi Fisik -
Info Detail Spesifik -
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