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Executive stock options: early exercise provisions and risk-taking incentives
Traditional executive stock option plans allow fixed numbers of options to vest periodically, independent of stock price performance. Because such options may climb deep in-the-money long before the manager can exercise them, they can exacerbate risk aversion in project selection. Making the proportion of options that vest a gradually increasing function of the stock price can ensure that appropriate numbers of options are retained while they provide risk-taking incentives, but are exercised once they have lost their convexity. "Progressive performance vesting" can allow the firm more efficiently to rebalance the manager's risk-taking incentives..Printed Journal
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | : The American Finance Association |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | Stock options Models Stock prices Risk assessment Executive compensation studies |
| ISBN/ISSN | 221082 |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |