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Uncertainty, opportunism, ans governance: the effects of volatility and ambiguity on formal and relational contracting

Comparing the effectiveness of contractual and relational governance in constraining opportunism under conditions of volatility and ambiguity, we hypothesize that relational contracts will be robust to volatility but not to ambiguity, whereas formal contracts will be robust to ambiguity but not to volatility. Data from 125 interorganizational relationships involving R&D for new-product development support these hypotheses. Our findings suggest that formal and relational contracts each have advantages and disadvantages in specific situations and are not simply substitutes. Our results challenge the view that relational contracts are resistant to opportunism. A revised comparative governance schema is theorized for future research.Printed Journal

Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
Penerbit Academy of Management.,
Edisi -
Subjek Organizational behavior
Contracts
Research & development
R&D
studies
Hypothesis testing
ISBN/ISSN 14273
Klasifikasi -
Deskripsi Fisik -
Info Detail Spesifik -
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