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This article examines how the compensation paid for outside directors affects firms' acquisition behavior. Using panel data of Standard & Poor's 1500 firms between 1996 and 2002, the authors find that stock and stock option pay for outside directors are related in an inverted U-shaped manner to a firm's acquisition rate and that for stock options, this relationship is moderated by board composition. Their findings suggest a dual agency model of corporate governance, according to which not only executives' incentives but also outside directors' incentives should be aligned with the shareholder value creation.Printed Journal
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | : Southern Management Association |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | Stock options Acquisitions & Mergers Executive compensation studies Outside directors |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1492063 |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |