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Decision making in acquisitions: the effect of outside directors' compensation on acquisition patterns

This article examines how the compensation paid for outside directors affects firms' acquisition behavior. Using panel data of Standard & Poor's 1500 firms between 1996 and 2002, the authors find that stock and stock option pay for outside directors are related in an inverted U-shaped manner to a firm's acquisition rate and that for stock options, this relationship is moderated by board composition. Their findings suggest a dual agency model of corporate governance, according to which not only executives' incentives but also outside directors' incentives should be aligned with the shareholder value creation.Printed Journal

Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
Penerbit Southern Management Association.,
Edisi -
Subjek Stock options
Acquisitions & Mergers
Executive compensation
studies
Outside directors
ISBN/ISSN 1492063
Klasifikasi -
Deskripsi Fisik -
Info Detail Spesifik -
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