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Competitive pricing on information: a longitudinal experiment
Theoretical work on the pricing of information reveals that competition between information sellers can result in prices that are negatively related to the quality or reliability of the information. The goal of this study is to test empirically the theory's counterintuitive predictions with the help of an experimental market based on a business simulation. An important feature of the experiment is that though the reliability of information products (forecasts) is exogenously set, it must be inferred by both buyers and sellers from historical forecasts about another market. The simulation is played for seven periods to allow the market to converge to stable information prices. The results from the longitudinal market experiment strongly support the theory. After some experimentation, prices converge to levels that are strikingly different between the two quality conditions. Beyond providing support for the theory on information markets, the experiment shows that information buyers and sellers are capable of learning the quality of information from the actual information products, and they are capable of understanding the strategic implications that result from the subtle interaction between the characteristics of information and its price.Printed Journal
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | American Marketing Association., |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | Competition Information Market strategy Pricing policies studies |
| ISBN/ISSN | 222437 |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |