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Decisions by rules: the case of unwillingness to pay for beneficial delays
Since the emergence of neoclassical economics, individual decision making has been viewed largely from an outcome-maximizing perspective. Building on previous work, the authors suggest that when people make payment decisions, they consider not only their preferences for different alternatives but also guiding principles and behavioral rules. Rules as a decision-making mechanism offer a great benefit because they organize individual and social behavior by following generalized principles. In this work, the authors identify a specific rule related to intertemporal consumption: Consumers should not pay for delays (even if they are beneficial). The authors describe two characteristics pertaining to the use of rules - rule invocation and rule override - and test them for the case of the aforementioned rule against payment for delayed experiences. The results show that money can function as the invoking cue for this rule, given that money, as opposed to another form of resource expenditure, leads to behavior that is consistent with the rule but not with preferences. The article concludes with a discussion of more general applications of such rules, which may explain some of the seemingly systematic inconsistencies in the ways consumers behave.Printed Journal
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | : American Marketing Association |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | Consumer behavior Decision making Willingness to pay studies |
| ISBN/ISSN | 222437 |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |