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What drives compensation for China's CEOs?
This research brief examines the determinants of CEO compensation in China’s evolving corporate landscape, where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) coexist with privatized firms. Analyzing data from 1998–2000, Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006) reveal that compensation structures vary significantly based on the type of dominant shareholder: State-controlled firms show weak pay-performance linkages, while private and foreign-owned firms align CEO pay more closely with shareholder wealth and offer incentive pay. The study highlights systemic challenges in China’s corporate governance, including inadequate oversight by state shareholders, a shallow executive talent pool, and limited financial transparency. Key findings suggest that further privatization and governance reforms—such as independent compensation committees—are needed to strengthen firm performance and attract skilled leaders. The research underscores the tension between China’s state-influenced model and market-driven practices, offering insights for policymakers and investors navigating its transitional economy...Printed Journal
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| AMP2101 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Briarcliff Manor, NY: Academy of Management 2007 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 21, No. 1, Feb., 2007 |
| Subjek | Corporate governance Privatization Firm performance CEO compensation Incentive pay State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) dominant shareholder financial transparency |
| ISBN/ISSN | 15589080 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 2 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | Academy of Management Perspectives |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |