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Explaining CEO compensation: how do talent, governance, and markets fit in?
This research brief investigates the drivers of escalating CEO compensation, focusing on why firms often fail to adopt Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE)—a practice that would decouple pay from broader market trends. Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006) analyze S&P 500 firms (1993–2001) and identify two key explanations: (1) CEO talent, where high-demand executives command premium pay during market upswings, and (2) rent extraction, enabled by weak corporate governance (e.g., CEO-chair duality). Their findings reveal that market sensitivity in compensation is primarily tied to executive labor market dynamics, with talented CEOs leveraging industry booms to negotiate higher pay. While governance flaws (e.g., infrequent board meetings) play a secondary role, post-Sarbanes-Oxley reforms may mitigate such issues. The study challenges the efficacy of blanket compensation reforms, suggesting that addressing talent scarcity and strengthening board oversight—particularly through independent compensation committees—could better align pay with genuine performance. These insights remain critical for policymakers and boards grappling with executive pay controversies...Printed Journal
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| AMP2101 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Briarcliff Manor, NY: Academy of Management 2007 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 21, No. 1, Feb., 2007 |
| Subjek | Corporate governance CEO compensation Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) rent extraction market sensitivity Sarbanes-Oxley Act executive labor market compensation committees |
| ISBN/ISSN | 15589080 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 3 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | Academy of Management Perspectives |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |