Corporate governance and acquirer returns | Pusat Sumber Belajar FEB UI

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Corporate governance and acquirer returns

Masulis, Ronald W. - ; Wang, Cong - ; Xie, Fei - ;

We examine whether corporate governance mechanisms, especially the market for corporate control, affect the profitability of firm acquisitions. We find that acquirers with more antitakeover provisions experience significantly lower announcement-period abnormal stock returns. This supports the hypothesis that managers at firms protected by more antitakeover provisions are less subject to the disciplinary power of the market for corporate control and thus are more likely to indulge in empire-building acquisitions that destroy shareholder value. We also find that acquirers operating in more competitive industries or separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board experience higher abnormal announcement returns..Printed Journal

Ketersediaan

Call Number	Location	Available
	PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana	1

Penerbit	The American Finance Association.,
Edisi	-
Subjek	Corporate governance Acquisitions & Mergers Abnormal returns studies
ISBN/ISSN	221082
Klasifikasi	-
Deskripsi Fisik	-
Info Detail Spesifik	-
Other Version/Related	Tidak tersedia versi lain
Lampiran Berkas	Tidak Ada Data