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Ownership form, managerial, incentives, and the intensity of rivalry
This study investigates how differences in ownership form - between franchised and company-owned units - affect managerial incentives and competitive pricing in different oligopolistic contexts. We argue that chains may restrict decision making in company-owned units as a commitment device to maintain high prices in concentrated markets and found evidence consistent with this argument. We also found that a unit's ownership form affected its rivals' competitive behavior. Our results indicate that company-owned units' ability to raise their own and rivals' prices in highly concentrated markets led to their higher performance relative to franchised units.Printed Journal
Call Number | Location | Available |
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PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
Penerbit | Academy of Management., |
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Edisi | - |
Subjek | Organizational behavior Incentives Oligopoly Ownership Organizational structure Correlation analysis studies Management decisions |
ISBN/ISSN | 14273 |
Klasifikasi | - |
Deskripsi Fisik | - |
Info Detail Spesifik | - |
Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |