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Discipline and liquidity in the interbank market
Using 20 years of panel data, I demonstrate that high-risk banks have consistently paid more than safe banks for interbank loans and have been less likely to use these loans as a source of liquidity. The economic importance of this effect was relatively small until the mid-1990s, when regulatory and institutional changes began to impose more of the costs of bank failure on uninsured creditors. Subsequently, interbank-market price discipline roughly doubled, and risk-based rationing effects increased by a factor of six. In imposing this discipline, lenders seem to care most about credit risk at borrowing institutions..Printed journal
Call Number | Location | Available |
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PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
Penerbit | The Ohio State University., |
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Edisi | - |
Subjek | Bank failures Bank loans Credit risk Bank liquidity Market prices studies Regulation of financial institutions |
ISBN/ISSN | 222879 |
Klasifikasi | - |
Deskripsi Fisik | - |
Info Detail Spesifik | - |
Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |