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Model uncertainty and delegation: a case for Friedman's k-percent money growth rule?

Kilponen, Juha - ; Leitemo, Kai - ;

Model uncertainty affects the monetary policy delegation problem. If there is uncertainty with regards to the determination of the delegated objective variables, the central bank will want robustness against potential model misspecifications. We show that with plausible degree of model uncertainty, delegation of the Friedman rule of increasing the money stock by k percent to the central bank will outperform commitment to the social loss function (flexible inflation targeting). The reason is that the price paid for robustness under flexible inflation targeting outweighs the inefficiency of money growth targeting. Imperfect control of money growth does not change this conclusion..Printed journal


Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
Penerbit: The Ohio State University
Edisi-
SubjekMonetary policy
Inflation
Central banks
Economic models
Uncertainty
studies
ISBN/ISSN222879
Klasifikasi-
Deskripsi Fisik-
Info Detail Spesifik-
Other Version/RelatedTidak tersedia versi lain
Lampiran BerkasTidak Ada Data

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