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A seller with some degree of market power in its product market can earn rents. In this context, there is a gain to granting credit to purchase of the product and thus to the establishment of a captive finance company. This paper examines the optimal behavior of such a durable good seller and its captive finance company. The model predicts a critical difference between the captive finance company's credit standard and that of independent lenders ("banks"), namely, that the captive finance company will adopt a more lenient credit standard. Thus, we should expect the likelihood of repayment of a captive loan to be lower than that of a bank loan, other things equal. This prediction is tested using a unique data set drawn from a major credit bureau in the United States, and the evidence supports the theoretical prediction..Printed journal
| Call Number | Location | Available | 
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 | 
| Penerbit | : The Ohio State University | 
|---|---|
| Edisi | - | 
| Subjek | Financial institutions Market segmentation Bank loans Models studies  | 
| ISBN/ISSN | 222879 | 
| Klasifikasi | - | 
| Deskripsi Fisik | - | 
| Info Detail Spesifik | - | 
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain | 
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |