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CEOs on the edge: earnings manipulation and stock-based incentive misalignment

Synthesizing agency theory and prospect theory, we examined the effects of stock-based incentives on CEO earnings manipulation behaviors. In analyses of data compiled from the public companies listed in Compustat's Executive Compensation Database and a U.S. General Accounting Office restatements database, we found that CEOs were more likely to manipulate firm earnings when they had more out-of-the-money options and lower stock ownership. Firm performance and CEO tenure interacted with out-of-the-money options and ownership to influence CEO earnings manipulation behaviors. Our findings inform agency-based views by providing evidence that, under certain conditions, stock-based managerial incentives lead to incentive misalignment..Printed journal

Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
Penerbit The Academy of Management.,
Edisi -
Subjek Stock options
Chief executive officers
Agency theory
Manipulation
Executive compensation
studies
ISBN/ISSN 14273
Klasifikasi -
Deskripsi Fisik -
Info Detail Spesifik -
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