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Attracting attention: cheap managerial talk and costly market monitoring

Almazan, Andres - ; Banerji, Sanjay - ; Motta, Adolfo De - ;

We provide a theory of informal communication - cheap talk - between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The analysis suggests that a policy of discretionary disclosure that encourages managers to attract the market's attention when the firm is substantially undervalued can create shareholder value. The theory also relates the credibility of managerial announcements to the use of stock-based compensation, the presence of informed trading, and the liquidity of the stock. Our results are consistent with the existence of positive announcement effects produced by apparently innocuous corporate events (e.g., stock dividends, name changes)..Printed journal


Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
Penerbit: The American Finance Association
Edisi-
SubjekLiquidity
Capital markets
Agency theory
Disclosure
Credibility
studies
ISBN/ISSN221082
Klasifikasi-
Deskripsi Fisik-
Info Detail Spesifik-
Other Version/RelatedTidak tersedia versi lain
Lampiran BerkasTidak Ada Data

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