Text
We analyze the role of an exchange rate peg as a commitment mechanism to achieve inflation stability when multiple equilibria are possible. We show that there are ex ante large gains from choosing a more conservative regime not only in order to mitigate inflation bias from time inconsistency but also to avoid high inflation equilibria. In these circumstances, using a pegged exchange rate as an anti-inflation commitment device can create a "trap" whereby the regime initially confers gains in anti-inflation credibility but ultimately results in an exit occasioned by a big enough adverse real shock that creates large welfare losses to the economy..Printed journal
| Call Number | Location | Available | 
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 | 
| Penerbit | : The Ohio State University | 
|---|---|
| Edisi | - | 
| Subjek | Inflation Equilibrium Foreign exchange rates studies  | 
| ISBN/ISSN | 222879 | 
| Klasifikasi | - | 
| Deskripsi Fisik | - | 
| Info Detail Spesifik | - | 
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain | 
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |