Hedge fund activism, corporate governance, and firm performance

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Hedge fund activism, corporate governance, and firm performance

Jiang, Wei - ; Brav, Alon - ; Partnoy, Frank - ; Thomas, Randall - ;

Using a large hand-collected data set from 2001 to 2006, we find that activist hedge funds in the United States propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two-thirds of the cases. Hedge funds seldom seek control and in most cases are nonconfrontational. The abnormal return around the announcement of activism is approximately 7%, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism. Our analysis provides important new evidence on the mechanisms and effects of informed shareholder monitoring..Printed Journal

Ketersediaan

Call Number	Location	Available
	PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana	1

Penerbit	The American Finance Association.,
Edisi	-
Subjek	Corporate governance Hedge funds Abnormal returns studies Shareholder activism
ISBN/ISSN	221082
Klasifikasi	-
Deskripsi Fisik	-
Info Detail Spesifik	-
Other Version/Related	Tidak tersedia versi lain
Lampiran Berkas	Tidak Ada Data