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International cross-listing, firm performance, and top management turnover: a test of the bonding hypothesis

We examine a primary outcome of corporate governance, namely, the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing CEOs, to test the effectiveness of U.S. investor protections in improving the corporate governance of cross-listed firms. We find that firms from weak investor protection regimes that are cross-listed on a major U.S. Exchange are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs than non-cross-listed firms. Cross-listings on exchanges that do not require the adoption of stringent investor protections (OTC, private placements, and London listings) are not associated with a higher propensity to remove poorly performing CEOs..Printed journal

Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
Penerbit The American Finance Association.,
Edisi -
Subjek Performance evaluation
Corporate governance
Chief executive officers
Effectiveness
studies
Terminations
ISBN/ISSN 221082
Klasifikasi -
Deskripsi Fisik -
Info Detail Spesifik -
Other Version/Related Tidak tersedia versi lain
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