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Emerging firms and the allocation of control rights: a Bayesian approach
This paper suggests that founders often use firm formation to exploit opportunities and must sometimes make organizing decisions about the allocation of control before the economic value of the opportunity can reliably be known even probabilistically. How do founders in these settings make residual control rights decisions - especially when two or more individuals are involved in the creation of a firm? This is an important question because the lack of reliable information about the set of outcomes and the probabilities associated with these early specific investments may result in the wrong allocation of residual control rights requiring changes to ownership as information is updated. What long-term consequences do these early organizing decisions have on the structure and performance of a firm? Motivated by these questions this paper uses incomplete contract theory and applies a Bayesian learning model to the allocation process of ownership control rights of founders in emerging firms. This model examines how founders in early stage emerging firms learn and build upon their prior beliefs enabling them to allocate and change ownership control rights under differing conditions of risk and uncertainty..Printed journal
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | : The Academy of Management |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | Management theory Business ownership studies Bayesian analysis |
| ISBN/ISSN | 3637425 |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |