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Both market and hierarchy: an incentive-systems theory of hybrid governance forms
Today economic activity is increasingly organized by fusing elements of hierarchies into market transactions (e.g., quasi-integration) or bringing aspects of markets within hierarchies (e.g., empowerment). These hybrid governance forms are not adequately addressed in most extant theories that envision a unidimensional continuum between markets and hierarchies, thereby ignoring true hybrids that are market-like in some ways yet hierarchy-like in others. We contribute first by creating a taxonomy of hybrid forms and second by developing a formal theory that predicts when a given hybrid form will be efficient. Our model is unique in that we consider cross-task synergies in a multi-task principal-agent model, where hybrid forms result as principals try to motivate cooperation among agents indirectly through incentives, ownership and formal authority. We conclude with a discussion of other mechanisms that might also help to understand and predict hybrid governance forms.Printed journal
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | : The Academy of Management |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | Management theory Cooperation Regulation studies Hierarchies |
| ISBN/ISSN | 3637425 |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |