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Compensation consultants and executive pay: evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom

Conyon, Martin J. - ; Peck, Simon I. - ; Sadler, Graham V. - ;

Executive compensation consultants are investigated using data from the United States and the United Kingdom. The study yields a number of findings. First, CEO pay is generally greater in firms that use compensation consultants, consistent with a rent-extraction theory of executive pay. Second, the amount of equity used in the CEO compensation package, such as stock options, is greater in firms that use consultants. This is consistent with alignment of manager and shareholder interests. Third, there is little evidence that using consultants with potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the adverse design of pay contracts..Printed journal


Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
AMP2301PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
PenerbitBriarcliff Manor, NY: Academy of Management 2009
EdisiVol. 23, No. 1, Feb., 2009
Subjekmanagerial power theory
compensation consultants
equity pay mix
optimal contracting theory
pay benchmarking
disclosure regulations
shareholder alignment
ISBN/ISSN15589080
KlasifikasiNONE
Deskripsi Fisik13 p.
Info Detail SpesifikAcademy of Management Perspectives
Other Version/RelatedTidak tersedia versi lain
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