High-water marks: high risk appetites? convex compensation, long horizons, and portfolio choice

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We study the portfolio choice of hedge fund managers who are compensated by high-water mark contracts. We find that even risk-neutral managers do not place unbounded weights on risky assets, despite option-like contracts. Instead, they place a constant fraction of funds in a mean-variance efficient portfolio and the rest in the riskless asset, acting as would constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) investors. This result is a direct consequence of the in(de)finite horizon of the contract. We show that the risk-seeking incentives of option-like contracts rely on combining finite horizons and convex compensation schemes rather than on convexity alone..Printed journal

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Ketersediaan

Call Number	Location	Available
	PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana	1

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

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No. Panggil

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Penerbit

: American Finance Association.,

Deskripsi Fisik

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Bahasa

ISBN/ISSN

221082

Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

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Subjek

Contracts
Compensation
Investment advisors
Hedge funds
Risk aversion
studies
Portfolio investments

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

pa

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

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