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High-water marks: high risk appetites? convex compensation, long horizons, and portfolio choice

We study the portfolio choice of hedge fund managers who are compensated by high-water mark contracts. We find that even risk-neutral managers do not place unbounded weights on risky assets, despite option-like contracts. Instead, they place a constant fraction of funds in a mean-variance efficient portfolio and the rest in the riskless asset, acting as would constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) investors. This result is a direct consequence of the in(de)finite horizon of the contract. We show that the risk-seeking incentives of option-like contracts rely on combining finite horizons and convex compensation schemes rather than on convexity alone..Printed journal

Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
Penerbit American Finance Association.,
Edisi -
Subjek Contracts
Compensation
Investment advisors
Hedge funds
Risk aversion
studies
Portfolio investments
ISBN/ISSN 221082
Klasifikasi -
Deskripsi Fisik -
Info Detail Spesifik -
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