Overconfidence, CEO selection, and corporate governance

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We develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager, who sometimes makes value-destroying investments, has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to CEO under value-maximizing corporate governance. Moreover, a risk-averse CEO's overconfidence enhances firm value up to a point, but the effect is nonmonotonic and differs from that of lower risk aversion. Overconfident CEOs also underinvest in information production. The board fires both excessively diffident and excessively overconfident CEOs. Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley is predicted to improve the precision of information provided to investors, but to reduce project investment.Printed journal

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Ketersediaan

Call Number	Location	Available
	PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana	1

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

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No. Panggil

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Penerbit

: American Finance Association.,

Deskripsi Fisik

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Bahasa

ISBN/ISSN

221082

Klasifikasi

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Tipe Isi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

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Subjek

Corporate governance
Chief executive officers
Confidence
Models
Risk aversion
US
studies

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

pa

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

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