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Replacing a "Disobedient" Central Bank Governor with a "Docile" One: A Novel measure of central bank independence and its effect on inflation

This paper identifies two mechanisms that empirical papers on central bank independence assume to be embedded in the yardstick measure of turnover rate of central bank governor: (i) the removal of a governor who is perceived as a challenger by the government and (ii) whether his/her replacement is an ally of the government. We identify the first mechanism with premature exits of central bankers and the second by examining whether or not the incoming governor is drawn from the ranks of the executive branch of the government. We find that only premature exits and replacements with government allies increase inflation. .Printed journal

Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
JMCB4306PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
Penerbit The Ohio State University.,
Edisi -
Subjek Monetary policy
Inflation
Central banks
Independence
studies
Public officials
ISBN/ISSN 222879
Klasifikasi -
Deskripsi Fisik -
Info Detail Spesifik -
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