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Social preferences and competition

There is a general presumption that social preferences can be ignored if markets are competitive. Market experiments (Smith 1962) and recent theoretical results (Dufwenberg et al. Forthcoming) suggest that competition forces people to behave as if they were purely self-interested. We qualify this view. Social preferences tend to be irrelevant if two conditions are met: separability of preferences and completeness of contracts. These conditions are often plausible, but they fail to hold when uncertainty is important (financial markets) or when incomplete contracts are traded (labor markets). Social preferences can explain many of the anomalies frequently observed on these markets. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT].Printed journal

Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
JMCB43S1PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
Penerbit The Ohio State University.,
Edisi -
Subjek Competition
Social sciences
Labor market
Securities Markets
Preferences
studies
ISBN/ISSN 222879
Klasifikasi -
Deskripsi Fisik -
Info Detail Spesifik -
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